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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition t o  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
iii 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
Rational Entrepreneurs or Optimistic Martyrs? 
Some Considerations on Technological Regimes, Corporate 
Entries and the Evolutionary Role of Decision Biases 
Giovanni Dosi 
Department of Economics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" 
a n d  
Dan Lovallo 
Wharton School, University of  Pennsylvania 
Support to this research,at different stages, by the Center for  Research in 
Management, U.C. Berkeley; the Italian National Research Council (CNR),the 
Italian Ministery of  Universi ty and  Research ("MURST 40 %") and 
Internat ional  Ins t i tu te  o f  Applied Sys tem Analysis  (IIASA),  Laxenburg ,  
Austria, the Huntsman and Jones at  t he  Wharton School ,  Universi ty of  
Pennsylvania i s  grateful ly acknowledged. This  version benefited f rom the 
comment s  o f  t he  par t ic ipants  and  organizers  of  t he  Confe rence  o n  
"Technological Oversights and Foresights", L.N. Stern School of Business, New 
York University, March 1994, and in particular Raghn Garud, Praaven Nayyar, 
Zur Shapira and Jim Utterback. 
This work is  partly based on  ongoing research with John Baldwin, Analytical 
Studies, Statistics Canada. 
I Introduction 
This is a rather conjectural report on the evolutionary role of decision biases - 
at both the level of individuals and of organizations -, and, in particular, on 
their importance to the processes of corporate entry and the change of 
industrial structures. 
A growing and quite robust body of evidence highlights the pervasiveness of 
various types of biases in individual decision making, accounting for 
systematic departures from predictions of the canonical model of rational 
choice (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1986), Tversky and Shafir (1992)). For our purpose here, we will 
mainly concern ourselves with o v e r c o n f i d e n c e  or optimism, which 
frequently leads to bold forecasts of the consequences of one's own actions. 
Also, by way of example, we will examine risk seeking in the domain of losses, 
which often yields escalating commitments in the face of failures 
Interestingly, these biases appear to carry over from the level of individuals 
to that of groups and organizations - and, indeed, might even be amplified in 
the latter circumstances (e.g. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Lovallo (1995), 
and the literature discussed there). In this respect, a challenging domain of 
investigation - with vast ramifications into the analyses of the nature of 
entrepreneurship, technological change, and industrial dynamics - is that of 
corporate entry into an industry. 
Numerous studies have shown that the vast majority of entrants fail (e.g. 
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988)). Furthermore, there are significant 
inter-industry differences in fai lure rates. Evidence of high-level firm 
failure rates appears to be consistent with experimental data showing that 
typically people are unrealistically optimistic, exhibit illusions of control in 
even modestly complex environments, and systematically neglect the statistics 
of previously observed performances. 
In this study, we report some preliminary results and conjectures from an 
ongoing investigation of entry, post-entry performances, and the collective 
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outcome of innovative successes and failures. 
First ,  we  propose  that  pers i s ten t  i n  t r  a - i ndus t ry  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  f i rm 
performances  a r e  the  jo in t  outcome of  a )  he terogeneous  pa t te rns  of  
organizat ional  learning and b) cognit ive mechanisms such  a s  unreal is t ic  
optimism and "competitive blind spots" - areas where agents  insufficiently 
consider the contingent decisions of their opponents. 
Second, we suggest some hypotheses on inter- industry differences in relative 
entry rates and post-entry performances using a taxonomy of technological 
and market regimes.  T h e  basic idea is  that knowledge and learning - 
concerning new products, new techniques, and new markets - are specific to 
d is t inc t  product ion  ac t iv i t ies .  In turn ,  " technologica l  paradigms"  map 
expecta t ions  and  co rpora t e  behaviours  in to  d ive r se  pa t te rns  of en t ry  
behaviours that are at  least partly independent of the standard measures of 
profitability and risk. Of course, were we to find robust corroboration of this 
conjecture, it would be  witness against  any na ive  'rational expectat ion '  
hypothesis o n  entrepreneurial  behaviour.  
Our third conjecture takes this argument a step further. W e  propose that m i c r o  
' i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s '  - in terms of unrealistic optimism etc ...- are likely to be  a 
fundamental ingredient in the collective development of new knowledrze bases 
and new industries. The  development of new technological paradigms and the 
related emergence of new industries and new 'technological communit ies '  
might  be  int imately associated with seemingly  wasteful  mistakes,  rough 
search heuristics, and even 'irrational' hubris,  rather than sober forecasts.  
Our empirical evidence is diverse. W e  will draw both on a few experimental 
studies, on the growing evidence on the economics of innovation and on  what 
we know from some statistical surveys and longitudinal samples of firms in 
manufacturing industries in a various countries. (A research aimed o t  test the 
foregoing conjectures, in collaboration with John Balwin, Statistics Canada, is 
currently taking shape).  
In sections I1 to IV we  briefly review the relevant evidence from behavioural 
decision research,  identify analogous biases in organizat ional  decision 
patterns, and present some experimental evidence on entry decisions. Section 
V discusses the evidence on  entry, post-entry performances, ex i t  and the 
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puzzles that all this entails. In section VI we outline some elements of an 
evo lu t iona ry  in t e rp re t a t ion  and  sugges t  s o m e  p romis ing  l i n k s  wi th  
complementary exercises in evolutionary modeling as well as  some possible 
fur ther  deve lopmen t s .  
I1 From individual biases to Organizational Errors 
In economics, the use of psychological assumptions other than rationality to 
make predictions about organizational behaviour i s  relatively rare, although 
the company is  quite good - including John Maynard Keynes, Herbert Simon, 
Richard Nelson,  Oliver  Will iamson and Sidney Winter ,  among o thers  -. 
Certainly, from an empirical point of view, there i s  massive evidence that 
individuals d o  deviate from the behavioural patterns prescribed by rational 
models. Furthermore, these deviations are systematic - the errors tend to be in 
the same direction - , which implies that "non-rational behaviour is often not 
random but predictable. 
However, one  of the major hurdles to incorporating alternative psycological 
assumptions in to  economic  models  is  a healthy skepticism about  how 
individual decision biases are likely to "scale up" to organizational outcomes. 
While it is  beyond the scope of this work to examine the vast literature on  
individual and organizat ional  decision making, there a re  good reasons to 
believe that organizations, in many instances, reinforce rather than mitigate 
individual decision biases ( see  for  example  March and Shapi ra  (1987) 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Lovallo (1995)). 
"Escalation" s i tuat ions a re  a very good example  of  t he  consistency of  
psychological phenomena in various contexts and at widely different units of 
analysis (ranging from individual choices under experimental condit ions all 
the way to enormous collective tragedies such as the Vietnam war). Two basic 
psychological principles lay at  the foundation of "escalation phenomena" , at 
the level of b o t h  individuals and organizations, namely : (i) people respond to 
changes  rather  than abso lu t e  levels;  and ,  ( i i )  they  exib i t  d iminish ing  
sensitivity to quantities of various items including money. 
As known, drawing o n  these two principles, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
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constructed prospect  theorv , a descriptive theory of risk taking, in which 
individuals , due to diminishing sensitivity for absolute quantities, are both 
risk averse for gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Risk seeking 
preferences for losses implies that when people have not made peace with 
their losses they are likely to place lower than expected-value bets in order to 
break even. On average, these bets will fail and lead to even greater losses. 
Fox and Staw (1979) show that considering an important aspect of social 
context - the need for accountability - enhances individual willingness to 
"throw good money after bad7'.Using managers as subjects, Bateman and 
Zeithami (1989b) also observe escalation behaviour. Finally, Bazerman et  a1 
(1984) find that groups escalate less frequently but more dramatically than 
individuals. At each point along the path from individual choice behaviour to 
individual choice embedded in a social context to group decision making, there 
is  reason to suspect  that also economic organizations will escalate 
commitments to losing courses of action . The consistency of the findings 
mentioned above and others (e.g. the cases that Janis (1982) and Ross and Staw 
(1986) recount on the Vietnam war and the Vancouver World Fair) indicate 
that these suspicions are valid. 
Quite similar  considerations apply to the widespread phenomena of 
overconfidence and "framing effects" in the interpretation of the available 
i n f o r m a t i o n .  
For example, March and Shapira (1987) suggest that managers tend to 
interpret uncertainty simply in terms of 'challenges' to their abilities and 
commitments to the pursuit of their goals. "Groupthink" has been identified as 
a cause of organizational optimism (Janis (1982)). Moreover, groups are prone 
to use 'representative heuristics' - the tendency to formulate probabilities on 
uncertain events based on the similarity of the event itself with some salient 
property of its parent population (Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Argote, 
Seabright and Dyer (1986)). 
There is extensive literature on overoptimism in project evaluation (e.g. for 
example Merrow et al. (1981)) and with regards to R&D (a discussion is in 
Freeman (1982)). Grossly optimistic errors are especially likely if the project 
involves new technology or otherwise places the firm in an unfamiliar 
territory. In an interesting discussion of the cause of failure in capital 
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investment projects, a s  Arnold (1986) finds: 
"Mos t  compan ies  suppor t  l a rge  capi ta l  expend i tu re  
programs with a worst case analysis that examines the 
projects '  loss potential.  But  'the worst case  forecast is  
almost always too optimistic ... When managers look at the 
downside  they general ly describe a mildly pessimistic 
future rather than the worst possible future". 
Standard operating procedures and decision methods, ranging from discounted 
cash-flows and net present value methods in investment evaluation to cost 
accounting, often involve framing effects ,  overconfidence,  preference for  
confirming evidence (for a discussion, especially with regard to technological 
innovation, see  Schoemaker and Marais (1995)). 
More generally, the acknowledgment of the specificities of  technological and 
organizational competences embodied in each firm (Teece et al. (1994), Dosi 
and Marengo (1993))  entai ls  also the recognit ion of  specif ic  heuristics, 
problem-framing, and ultimately of diverse collective structures of cognition 
defining what the organization can do, how it does it, and where and how it 
can search  for  novel  technologies  and products .  Clear ly ,  compe tence  
specificity, other things being equal, will tend to strengthen an inside view in 
forecasts and decisions. That  view - as detailed in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) - draws on knowledge on the case at 
hand, and constructs  an ideal history of the  future condit ional  o n  the 
sequences of actions by the decision makers. (In contrast, an 'outside view' is  
statistical and comparative drawing from past experiences of analogous cases). 
In brief, organizational decision-making in general, and, a fortiori, relatively 
unique 'strategic'  activities concerning innovation, diversification and entry 
- grounded in firm-specific knowledge - i s  often likely to involve biased 
assessments of  one's own  technological and competitive abilities (stemming 
from overconfidence,  ' inside view', i l lusion of control) ,  and inert ial  and 
escalating commitments (with neglect of  potentially relevant information and 
'sunk cost fallacies'). We  suggest that entrepreneurial decisions of entry are 
no exception. 
In particular, i t  i s  worth reporting some experiments by o n e  of  u s  (Dan 
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Lovallo) indicating how 'inside view' thinking is likely to lead to excess entry. 
We refer to the prediction that there will be  excess entry as  the O D  t i m i s m  
h v p o t h e s i s .  The  experiments reported below serve three purposes. 
First, one would like to test whether the relative optimism that we see in non- 
competi t ive environments survives in the face o f  competi t ive interaction. 
Second, the controlled environment allows us to unpack the effect that various 
types of inside view thinking have on entry. Third, these experiments may 
provide clearer insights about the psychology of competition, which would 
lead to more informative field surveys of entrants. 
I11 Experimental Design 
The isomorphism between the experiment and the industrial activity that we  
model is illustrated in figure 1. 
Fig. 1 
Experimental Model 
Industry 
Opportunity 
I Competitor Analysis 
Decision 
Competition 
Performance E l  
Experiment 
- - 
Capacity 
Number of 
Decision rl 
Competition 
It is reasonable to assume that one of the first steps towards entry is for a firm 
to undertake some kind of market assessment in order to determine if there is  
sufficient opportunity in terms of  probability and the s ize o f  a market to 
warrant entry.  In the experiments, subjects are provided with information 
about the market capacity - the number of  entrants that can earn positive 
amounts of money in any given period. The next step in the entry process is  
competitor analysis. In an industrial setting this procedure involves multiple 
dimensions including estimating the likely number and quality of  potential 
entrants. In these experiments  we  explicitly ask subjects  to est imate the 
number of entrants they expect to enter in each period. Implicitly, they make 
their entry decision, which is  the next step in the process. Finally, in both 
environments there is  competition and diverse performances which result in 
differential payoffs based on  relative skills. 
Given this broad overview of the experimental model let u s  be  more specific 
about  particular experiments  where w e  manipulate several  factors  in the 
competitive environment. One of the most important manipulations is  whether 
subjects self-selected themselves into a particular experiment or  not. In some 
experiments  subjects  a re  recruited to participate in entry games  and no 
particular information i s  given about the dimension o n  which the  subjects 
will compete. In other experiments we  explicitly ask for subjects that consider 
themselves to be  above the median in terms of their knowledge of  sports or  
current events. The  subjects share common knowledge about the method in 
which they were recruited. In addition to the self-selection manipulation, the 
entry games occur in three different competitive environments: simultaneous 
entry without  feedback,  s imultaneous entry with feedback,  and  sequential 
entry. In the simultaneous entry conditions, all of the subjects make their 
entry decisions at the same time. The  feedback that the subjects receive is 
about the number of entrants that entered in the previous period. In the 
sequential entry condition, each subject is  given an entry order number that 
remains constant throughout the experiment. For example,  the subject  with 
entry order number one  makes h is  entry decision first, subject  two goes 
second, etc. All of the entry decisions are public knowledge. 
In all of the experiments we use an identical payoff table, which is presented 
in figure 2. 
Fig. 2 
Experimental Payoff Table 
Payoff  f o r  S u c c e s s f u l c t i o n  of C II II 
( m a r k e t  c a p a c i t y )  
The amounts listed are the payoffs for the successful entrants for each market 
capacity. Unsuccessful  entrants  always lose  $10. Consider  the fol lowing 
example. If market capacity is two, then the highest ranked entrant receives 
$33, the second highest ranked entrant receives $17, and anyone else that 
enters the market loses $10. In any case the maximum total possible profits in 
the market are $50. This means that if five more entrants in excess of market 
capacity will come in the total profit in the market will be $0. For example, if 
there are seven entrants when the market capacity is two the total profit for 
the entrants as  a group will be  $0, since the two top-ranked entrants will split 
$50 according to the payoff table and the third- trough seventh-  ranked 
entrants will each lose $10. If there were 8 entrants when the market capacity 
was 2 total profits would be $ -10. 
X a n k  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
In each experiment there are two different ranking procedures: random rank 
and skill  based rank. In the random rank procedure, subjects '  ranks are 
predetermined by  a random number generator. Subjects  d o  not know their 
ranks prior to making their entry decisions. After all the entry decisions have 
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"C" 
2 
3 3 
17 
6 
14 
12 
10 
7 
5 
2 
4 
2 0 
15 
10 
5 
8 
11 
10 
8 
7 
6 
4 
3 
2 
been made, a tournament starts, to be played for real money. It is only at this 
point that subjects learn of their randomly assigned ranks. In the skill based 
rank condition subjects are shown examples of the types of questions on 
which their ranks will be  based. However, they do  not answer the questions 
until all of the entry decisions have been made. Then, subjects are given a 
quiz and their ranks are based on the number of questions they answer 
correctly. The  purpose of the random ranked condition is to control for risk 
preferences. In games with asymmetric payoff functions such as the one 
described here there is no way ex ante to determine the equilibrium number 
of entrants without knowing subjects' risk preferences. Since the subjects do  
not change across the different version of the experiment, if we assume that 
their risk preferences do  not change from one condition to the next, the only 
reason for greater entry in the skill-ranked condition is that subjects have 
more sanguine views of  their probability of success than in the random 
ranked condition. It is the difference in the number of entrants in the two 
conditions that will be  the primary measure of interest throughout the 
experiments. Figure 3 contains an example of the actual form subjects use to 
record their responses. 
Fig. 3 
Market Experiment A - Random Rank 
NAME DATE 
Payoff for Successful Entrants as a function 
of "Cff 
How much would you earn if C=6,  you entered, and your rank was 5 
among the entrants? -- 
R a n k  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
How much would you earn if C=2, you entered, and your rank was 4 
among the entrants? 
If, for example their are 12 periods in each condition, balls numbered 1-24 will 
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2 0  
15 
1 0  
5 
6 
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8 
1 1  
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8 
7  
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be placed in a bingo cage at the end of the experiment : the period 
corresponding to the chosen ball will be played for real money. The 
experimental procedure is summarized in Table 1. 
Tab. 1 Experimental Procedure 
Read instruction aloud 
Comprehension test on the payoff 
Explanation of the two types of ranking 
Subjects are shown examples of the skill question 
Subjects are informed that one period will be played 
for real money 
Subjects make their forecasts and entry decisions in 
the random rank condition 
Subjects make their forecasts and entry decisions in 
the skill rank condition 
After all of the entry decisions are made, subjects 
take the quiz 
A randomly drawn period is chosen to be played 
Subjects'  earnings a re  computed and immediately 
p a i d  
I V  Summary of the Results 
Without going into too much detail, which can be found in Lovallo (1995a), 
this section summarizes the results from the experiments. There are four 
findings that are of interest. First, it is clear that there is excess entry in the 
skill condition as compared to the risk-controlling random rank condition. 
This was true in each and every experiment. Furthermore, the expected value 
of entering in the random rank condition was significantly positive in all of 
the experiments, while it was significantly negative in all of the skill ranked 
conditions. Second, the excess entry that we observe in these experiments is 
not caused by "blind spots", i.e. on average subjects' forecasts of the number of 
entrants are accurate. This  means that subjects in the skill  condit ion are 
saying, "I realize that on average people are going to lose money in this 
market, but I'm not - I'm in!" 
The next finding is the most surprising. In experiments without self-selection, 
we find a significant divergence between the number of entrants in the skill 
versus random rank conditions. However, this divergence is dwarfed by the 
magnitude of  the divergence in markets with self-selection. This  suggests that 
a la rge .  amount of excess entry is caused by reference group neglect (Lovallo 
1995). rather than some  variant of optimism. Reference group neglect refers 
to the tendency of  people to underappreciate the group with which they are 
competing. I t  is a competi t ive manifestation o f  inside view thinking. For  
example, suppose that you are a phenomenally good cook and you are thinking 
of opening a restaurant. If you are asked to evaluate yourself as  a cook in 
comparison to the general population, you might say that you are in the top 
5% - and you might be  right. However, a more pertinent question is how good 
of a cook are you in comparison to others in the restaurant business, almost all 
of which consider themselves, and probably are, in the top of 5% of cooks. 
Reference group neglect  implies  that you will insufficiently regress your 
prediction of  your relative ability in this more competitive group. 
Finally, it is useful to point out that the effect that we  are discussing is robust 
across many different  types of  competi t ive environments.  T h e  effect  i s  
significant with feedback and without self-selection and is even more robust 
without feedback and with self-selection. Furthermore, the effect  works in 
both simultaneous and sequential entry games. Indeed, there is no  significant 
difference between the effect  in these two environments, which i s  rather 
astonishing. This  means that in  a sequential entry environment, people are 
making a decision to enter knowing with probability one  that the value of the 
game to the player as a group is already negative! 
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Our general conjecture is that this experimental evidence on  cognitive and 
decision biased bears important implications also for the understanding of  
a c t u a l  entry processes of new firms in industry. In order to argue the point, 
let us begin by considering some available evidence on corporate entry and 
ent rants '  pe r fo rmances .  
V Pat terns  of e n t r y ,  post  entry  performance  a n d  exit  in  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
Paul Geroski (1991) identifies four major 'stylized facts' on the entry process. 
F i r s t ,  "many firms attempt to enter each year, but [...I few survive for more 
than a year or  two. The average entrant is, it seems, basically a tourist and not 
an immigrant,  enjoying a life that is often nasty, brutish, and, above all, 
short" (p. 283). S e c o n d ,  "different measures of entry (net and gross entry 
measures, entry based on sales or on number of firms) are not very highly 
related to each other1' (p.287). T h i r d ,  "there are a range of different types of  
entrants, and some  are  more  successful at  penetrating markets or  surv ive  
than others" (p.290). F o u r t h ,  "the effects of entry [on market performance] - 
like the lives of most entrants - are fairly modest" (p.293). 
Dunne et al. (1988) examines the patterns of firm entry, growth, and exit of 
different types of firms over the period 1963-1982 using plant-level data from 
the U.S. Census of Manufacturers. For the 1967 entrant cohort, 63.8% of all new 
firm, new-plant entrants  exi ted within f ive  years, whi le  49 .6% of all  
diversifying-firm, new-plant entrants exited. T h e  difference in fai lure rates 
is similar as the cohorts age. Within fifteen years, 87.9% of the new firm-new 
plant exited, while 74.6% of the diversifying-firm, new-plant entrants exited. 
The differences between de novo and diversifier exit rates are substantial for 
all the cohorts in the sample at any of the time periods measured. 
The  high mortality of  entrants i s  corroborated by  longitudinal studies on 
industr ial  l i f e  cyc les  ( see  Hannan and Freeman (1989) ,  Carro l l  and 
Swaminathan (1992), Klepper (1992)), and s o  are the differences in post-entry 
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performances according to different types of entrants  and the timing of  
e n t r y .  
Consider, for  example,  Lane 's  investigation of  ATM manufacturers  (Lane 
(1989)). The ATM market began shortly before 1969. The  first firm to enter the 
market was Money Machine Inc. in 1967. An interesting pattern of entry 
develops over the life-cycle of this industry. The  earliest entrants into the 
industry were almost all de novo entrants; the next group of  entrants were the 
diversifying firms; the  final wave of  entry came from foreign firms. The  
average entry date for the three groups of firms were 1970, 1975, and 1979, 
respectively. The  reasonably distinct partition between the entry dates for the 
three entrant types suggests that there is  a systematic difference between the 
firm types that drive entry behaviour. De novo firms, obviously, a re  start-up 
firms without any prior production experience. All of the diversifying firms 
that entered this industry had prior production experience in a related 
domestic industry. Specifically, diversifying firms had production experience 
in ei ther  cash-handling products, securi ty products  (safe and vaults) ,  o r  
computers. The  foreign firms all had prior experience producing ATMs abroad 
prior to entering the U.S. market, although the degree to which they were 
selling other products in  the U.S. market varies. (The question of whether 
prior U.S. market experience is  a significant contributor to success is  an 
interesting one  that is  not addressed in the Lane study.) 
Docutel, a de novo entrant, was the dominant firm in the early years of the 
industry. However, as  time went on, the de novo entrants lost share to the 
diversifying entrants. In the middle to late 1970s, Diebold, an early diversifier, 
became the dominant firm and held that position until the end of the sample 
period, 1986. The  rise of  Diebold coincided with the period when the overall 
size of the ATM market grew most rapidly. Eventually, in October 1986 when 
Docudel exited, all of the d e  novo entrants were a memory. Furthermore, the 
average life-span for all of the de novo and diversifying f irms that entered 
after the median entry date for  their respective groups, except for  the lone 
surviving firm Concord, was less than two and a half years. Whether these 
firms made o r  lost money cannot be  determined from the  avai lable data. 
However, given that sunk costs play a significant role in this industry, it does 
not seem likely that such a brief visit would be profitable. 
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The big winners in this market in terms of market shares were Diebold, NCR 
and IBM - all early diversifying entrants. The experience that these firms had 
in safes  and computers  appeared to provide production advantages  that 
increased market share and the likelihood of  survival. Firm-wide production 
experience unrelated to the ATM industry did not confer an advantage either 
in terms o f  market  sha re  or  survival .  Furthermore,  previous sa fe  and 
computer experience with banks has  greater advantages for  survival and 
market share than non-bank related safe and computer experience. 
A somewhat similar story emerges from Mitchell 's account o f  the medical 
diagnostic imaging industry (Mitchell (1989), (1991), (1993)): o n e  observes 
waves of  new entrants (both de  novo and diversifying entrants) linked with 
the introduction of  new major  technologies (nuclear  imaging  scanners,  
ul t rasound equipment  e tc . ) ,  mortal i ty ra tes  espec ia l ly  high among new 
comers, and incumbents regaining relatively quickly their dominant  market 
shares. In fact, newcomer market share fell to 10% or less by 1988 in all of the 
subfields except for  ultrasound. Even in ultrasound where newcomers are a 
majority, their market share was less than 50% in 1988. In the subfields there 
have been waves of  fluctuations in newcomer market share associated with 
newcomer product innovations. However, in all but the most recent upsurge of  
newcomer sha re  in  t he  ul trasound segment incumbents  recovered their  
market position. 
Incumbents were also much more likely to survive (84%) in comparison to 
diversifying (44%) and de novo firms (29%) as of 1988. The method of exit also 
differs systematically between the firm types. 70% of the de novo firms that 
exit d o  s o  by closing down, whereas 70% of the diversifying or  incumbent 
firms sell  their business when they exit.  Even the early newcomers to 
industries, o n e  of  the first three newcomers in each subfield,  performed 
relatively poorly. Only 2 o f  15 early newcomers still  existed in 1990 and 
neither of these firms was in the top three in market share. This performance 
stands in sharp contrast to the early incumbent entrants - 10 of 15 survived 
until 1990 and 5 of the 10 survivors were market share leader in 1988. In the 
medical diagnosis imaging industry it seems that d e  novo and diversifying 
firms' innovations contribute more to the evolution of  the industry than to 
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these firms' own success. 
Other industries, however, suggest quite different patterns. In semiconductors 
(Dosi (1984) and Malerba (1985)), some de novo entrants have indeed become 
the industry leaders while most diversifiers from seemingly related industries 
have failed. Likewise,  in t he  computer  communication industry,  the main 
actors have been new firms (Pelkey (1993)).  Somewhat  similarly, in  the 
pho to l i t hograph ic  a l ignmen t  equ ipmen t ,  i ncumben t s  h a v e  f a red  ra ther  
poorly, and each reconfiguration of product technologies has  been associated 
with the emergence of new industry leaders (Henderson (1988) and (1993), 
Henderson and Clark (1990). 
At broader levels of  description - often 2- to 4-  digit industries - some 
intersectoral regulari t ies  in the process of  entry,  growth,  and  mortality 
appear to emerge.  So ,  for example, entry, while being a very pervasive 
phenomenon,  appears  to be  posi t ively cor re la ted  with the  number  of 
incumbents, the growth of  shipments  in the industry and  i ts  variability; 
whereas there seem to be  little correlation with industry profitability. Entry 
in concentrated industries seems to be  lower in terms of number of firms but 
entrants tend to be  bigger and have a higher life expectancy. The  probability 
of survival of new small firms appear to be  lower in capital-intensive and 
innovation-intensive industries. Hazard rates d o  not appear to be  affected by 
scale economies in low-tech industries but they are  in high-tech ones. The  
instantaneous effect of entry on  output in terms of shares is  generally low, 
but the medium-term one (of those surviving) is quite significant1. 
Moreover, hazard rates and post-entry performances seems to be  significantly 
influenced by  the nature of the entrant  (whether  de novo start-up or 
diversifying from other  sectors).  
Finally, other  more detai led traits of the entrants  (such as educat ional  
On all these properties, see Dunne, Roberts and Sarnuelson (1988), Baldwin and Gorecki 
(1990) and (1991), Cable and Schwalbach (1991), Bianco and Sestito (1992), Aldrich and 
Auster ( 1986), Acs and Audretsch (1990) and (1991), Phillips and Kirchoff (1989). 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1991), Mahmood (1992), Geroski and Schwalbach (1991), 
Baldwin (1994), Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1994). 
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at tr ibutes o f  the  founders  and the  organizat ional  s t ra teg ies)  s e e m s  to 
influence survival probabilities (Briiderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992)).  
What do we  make of all this evidence on entry, performances, and mortality? 
How do we  relate it with the cognitive and decision biases discussed in the 
previous section ? And what is the importance of these biases for technical 
change and industrial dynamics? 
VI An evolutionary view of knowledge and biases in economic 
c h a n g e  
There  a re  three major building blocks in our argument,  namely: F i r s t ,  
cognitive biases a re  widespread attributes of  adaptation and discovery in 
complex and evolving environments. S e c o n d ,  the nature of such biases - or, 
more generally of decision rules - can be inferred to a large extent from the 
characteristics of the knowledge upon which agents draw. This applies also to 
entry decisions. T h i r d ,  at least with regards to entry, biases might often have a 
posi t ive col lec t ive  ef fec t ,  in  that  they might  be  necessary to t r igger  
exploratory behaviours and contr ibute to the development o f  commonly  
shared 'technological paradigms' and ultimately foster the establishment and 
diffusion of new knowledge and new organizational forms. 
Learning, competence traps and biases 
One of  the remarkable features of most of  the evidence discussed in sections I1 
to IV is  that biases a re  prone to emerge also in circumstances where the 
dec is ion  problem i s  suf f ic ien t ly  t ransparent  to a l low the  unequivocal  
identification of 'rational' decision procedures. A fortiori, one can expect them 
to emerge  in more  opaque  and changing  environments.  O f  course ,  an 
interpretation o f  such  phenomena could be  simply in terms o f  human 
fallibility, due  for  example  to some  underlying computat ional  l imitat ion,  
at tent ion economiz ing ,  and  iner t ia l  re inforcement  of  pas t  behavioura l  
responses. Far from denying that all these factors are at  work, the line of 
inquiry that we want to pursue here is that, more fundamentally, these biases 
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might  be  an unavo idab le  coro l la ry  o f  the  ways  agents  f o r m  their  
interpretat ive models  of  the world and their  behavioura l  rout ines  in 
evolu t ionary  env i ronmen t s .  
It seems to us that a growing number of contributions from different camps - 
evolutionary economics,  organization theory, cognit ive psychology,  artificial 
sciences - are starting to converge in their analyses of learning processes in 
all circumstances when the environment continuously changes o r  in any case 
is  sufficiently complex to entail some c o m p e t e n c e  between the skills 
notionally required for decision and those 'naturally' available to the agents 
(Heiner (1983) and (1988)). It is  clearly a perspective which goes back to the 
research programme o f  Simon,  Cyert  , March, Nelson and Winter  on  the  
nature and implicat ions o f  'bounded rat ional i ty '  and  has  been recently 
enriched by experimental evidence and computer-simulated models. 
To make a long story very short, this perspective implies a radical shift in the 
object of analysis: rather than focusing on  the signals that the environment 
delivers to the unit of  decision, it emphasizes the  inner features of  the 
r e sponse  mechan i sm o f  t he  un i t  i tself  and  o n  the  ways  in t e rna l  
representations of  the world are c o n ~ t r u c t e d . ~  
There are some quite general implications that come out of  this perspective. 
First,  facing an essential  ambiguity in the relat ionships between events  
actions and outcomes3,  agents are bound to search for appropriate categories 
which frame cognition and actions. 
Second,  action ru les  often take  the form o f  relatively event- invariant  
routines which are nonetheless 'robust', in the sense that they apply to entire 
classes of seemingly analogous problems. 
Third, adaptive learning , involving interrelated units of knowledge (i.e. some 
sort of  cognitive systems), tend to lead to lock-in phenomena. 
For example, Dosi and Egidi (1991) discuss this learning dynamics in the 
simple case of the Rubik cube and Dosi et  al. (1994) show in a simulated model 
of adapting learning the  emergence of  economic rules such as marking-up 
prices.  Levinthal  (1993)  s tudies organizat ional  adaptat ion o n  a 'rugged 
Holland (1975), Holland et a1 (1986), Dosi and Egidi (1991), Schrader, Riggs and Smith 
(19931, March (1988). Dosi and Marengo (1993), Marengo (1992), Levinthal (1994), among 
o thers  
On the notion of ambiguity as distinct from uncertainty, see Einhorn and Hogarth 
(19851, March (1988), Marengo (1992), Schrader, Riggs and Smith (1993) 
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landscape' (i.e. to a selection environment characterized by interdependent 
and non-linear contributions of various organizational attributes to the 
'fitness' of the organization): he shows the adaptive emergence of few 
archetypes of organizations and behavioural patterns which - depending on 
the interdependence among traits - tend to lock organizational evolution even 
when the external environment changes in ways that are unfavourable to the 
existing set-ups. Marengo (1992) presents a model of co-evolution between 
organizational representations of the environment and i ts  behavioural 
responses in a changing environment. 
For our purposes here, what is important to notice is that by switching the 
analytical emphasis from agents as 'information-processors' to agents as 
'imperfect explorers' and as 'problem-solvers', it is easy to appreciate the 
widespread emergence of cognitive frames and decision routines. They are in 
a sense the inevitable outcome of imperfect adaptation to ever-changing and 
potentially surprising environments,  even if they appear a s  'biases '  
whenever the environment is simple enough as to notionally allow more 
refined and orthodox rational decision procedures. 
All this applies, we suggest, to individuals and even more so, to organizations. 
Bu t  see ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a s  p rob lem-so lve r s  na tu ra l ly  l e a d s  to 
acknowledgement of the role of their internal knowledge, competences and 
'visions' as prime determinants of their behaviours. As Levinthal puts it, 
"the ability of firms to evaluate and utilize outside 
knowledge is a function of their level of prior related 
knowledge. [The latter] confers an ability to recognize 
the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends which ... collectively constitute a firm's 
"absorptive capacity" (Levinthal in this volume) 
Moreover, as emphazized in Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and (1990), such 
absorptive capacity is path-dependent, given its cumulative nature and its co- 
evolution with expectation formation (see also Dosi (1988)). From an 
evolutionary point of view, the development of specific problem-solving 
competence is a necessary condition for survival but such competences are 
inevitably 'local', reinforced by past history but not necessarily relevant 
today4 . 
Indeed, our general conjecture i s  that it i s  precisely these features of  
knowledge that tend to produce many of the biases discussed above. 
For example, cumulative and idiosynchratic knowledge may easily imply an 
' inside view'  o f  fu ture  outcomes.  Previously successful  problem-solving 
routines can b e  expected  to  lead to overconf idence  o n  their  fu ture  
applicability. And the Schumpeterian perception o f  the permanent existence 
of unexploi ted opportunit ies  o f  innovation a re  likely to  resul t  in  'de- 
strategizing' of behaviours - i.e. actions whose outcomes depends also an 
interacting firms are seen on the contrary as part of  a 'game against nature' 
(Dosi and Marengo (1993)): putting it more vividly, as once a senior officer of 
Intel was telling one  of us when asked about their strategies, "...strategies 
might be a concern for our competitors; we  are just better than the others 
and our  only goal is to remain that way...". 
T o  summarize: what we  suggest here is that decision biases are to large extent 
t he  downs ide  of  competence-bui ld ing  and Schumpeter ian  processes  o f  
discovery and implementation of  cognitive frames and routines apt to make 
sense  and control imperfectly understood environments. 
Knowledge bases, entry and post-entry performances 
A 'knowledge-centered '  view of  organizat ional  behaviours makes  a n ice  
contrast  with ' information-centered' o r  " incentive-centered '  ones  also with 
respect to entry decisions. Drastically simplifying, an 'incentive story' on the 
entry process would star t  by the identification of proxies for  expected 
profitabilities; make some assumptions on  the information to which would-be 
entrants have access (rational expectations being the most extreme one) and 
then derive predict ions on  entry dynamics microfounded o n  rational and 
unbiased decision processes.5 A similar modeling strategy can obviously be  
On the notion of organizational competence and their characteristics, see Dosi,Teece 
and Winter (1992), Teece and al. (1994), Dosi and Marengo (1993), Teece,Pisano and 
Schuen (1992) 
More sophisticated variants of this same story would allow also for incomplete 
information on one's own ability relative to the other competititors, as in Jovanovic (1982) 
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applied to e.g. the propensity to innovate of incumbents vs. entrants (cfr. 
Arrow (1962), Reinganum (1983) and the critical discussion in Henderson 
(1993)). The major point, in any case, is that some hypothesis on an unbiased 
rationality and a fine perception of the 'objective' incentive structure allows 
the theorist to work so to speak 'backward' from future outcomes to past entry 
decis ions .  
Conversely, the 'knowedge-centered' (or 'evolutionary') story only needs to 
assume, on the incentive side, what elsewhere we have called weak incentive 
c o m ~ a t i b i l i t v  (Dosi and Marengo (1993)), that is, put very roughly, the 
perception, - no matter how biased, self-condescending, etc. - that '...there are 
some unexploited opportunities out there and if I' m good I can derive some 
economic benefit from them ... ".6 Rather, the core of the story relates expected 
behaviours to some specific characteristics of the knowledge bases on which 
agents are likely to draw and to some internal characteristics of the agents 
themselves - including , of course, their problem-solving competences - . In 
this perspective, the predictions of the theory rests on exercises of "mapping" 
between a) modal learning processes approximately shared by the entire 
relevant population of agents, or some subsets of them; b) the institutional 
ar rangements  under  which agents  in teract ;  and,  c )  thei r  revealed 
p e r f o r m a n c e s  
A good deal of work has already been done along these lines , at both empirical 
and theoretical levels. 
In terms of empirical investigation, and related "appreciative theorizing" - as 
Nelson and Winter would call it - one finds, for example, Pavitt's taxonomy on 
the sectoral patterns of generation and use of innovation (Pavitt (1984)). The 
basic exercise there is  to identify the fundamental sources and procedures of 
innovative activities specific of each sector (e.g. does innovative knowledge 
draw heavily on scientific advances? Or is it much more informal and for 
example relies on tacit design skills? Is innovation mainly related to the 
introduction of new products or to the adoption and efficient use of inputs 
produced by someone else?; etc.). Next, it derives propositions on the 
Of course there are cases, whereby not even such weak incentive requirements are 
fulfilled: think for example of many features of the past Soviet innovation system, or 
think of circumstances with zero appropriability of innovation, such as for long time 
seed-related agricultural innovations (more on appropriability issues in the survey in 
Dosi (1988)). 
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characteristics of the innovating firms (whether they will be typically big or  
small; single product firms or  diversified ones; e t ~ . ) ~  . Another exercise in a 
similar spirit is that by Dosi, Teece, Winter (1992) and Teece et  al. (1994) who 
derive predictions on the boundaries of the f i rm - condit ional  o n  their 
principal act ivi t ies  - f rom the nature o f  the competences  which their 
principal activities imply. 
From a dynamic point o f  view, several studies have analyzed the typical 
patterns of evolution o f  industries following the emergence and establishment 
of a "technological paradigms" (e.g. Dosi (1984)) o r  "dominant designs" (e.g. 
Utterback and Suarez (1993)), often identifying some invariant features along 
a "technological life cycle" (Gort and Klepper (1982), Klepper (1992)). 
Moreover, continuities or  breaks in the process of knowledge accumulation - 
yielding "competence-enhancing"  o r  "competence-des t roying"  technica l  
progress - have  been found to be  robust  predictors  of  the  relat ive 
performance of  incumbents vs. new entrants (Henderson and Clark (1990), 
Henderson (1  993)) .  
At the level of more formal theory, diverse r e ~ i m e s  of learn in^ and market 
select ion have  been used to explain different patterns of  evolut ion of 
industr ial  s t ruc tures ,  inc luding  changes  in  industr ial  concent ra t ion ,  s i ze  
distributions, turbulence in market  shares,  growth and dea th  probabil i t ies  
conditional on size and age (Winter (1984), Dosi and Salvatore (1992), Dosi et  
a1.(1994)). Basically, the exercise involves some stylized representation of the 
learning regime - formally captured by a part icular  s tochast ic  process 
driving the access to new firm-specific technologies - ; the analysis of the 
collective outcomes of  competitive interactions; and their comparison under 
different  regimes.8 
Our  general  conjec ture  - which unfortunately we  a r e  s t i l l  unable  to 
substantiate in this preliminary report - is that Jhe  characteristics o f  learning 
regimes are also a major ~ r e d i c t o r  of (i) the rates of entry into an industry; 
f i i )  the relative freauencies of different t p e s  of entrant (e.g. new start-ups 
vs. diversifiers); and . (iii) ~ o s t - e n t r y  ~e r fo rmances  . 
For further evidence on this point, see Malerba and Orsenigo (1995), (1995a) and 
(1995b)  
A discussion of diverse corporate behaviours under different technological regimes in 
evolutionary models of industrial change is in Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) and (1995a). 
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Amongst  the  d iscr iminat ing  features of each  regime the  evolut ionary  
literature has identified 1)  the richness of innovative opportunities; 2) the 
degrees of codifiability of knowledge (vs. its 'tacitness'); 3) its serendipity vs. 
specificity to a particular activity; 4) the levels of 'cumulativeness'  of 
technological and organizational learning. Well, we predict these factors to be 
discriminating also in terms of patterns of entry and performances. So ,  for 
example, one may derive propositions like the following: 
a )  o ther  things be ing  equa l ,  the  higher the perce ived technological  
opportunities, the higher will be  entry rates, irrespectively of post-entry 
p e r f o r m a n c e s ;  
b) knowledge serendipity positively affects entry rates but not necessarily 
survival  probabil i t ies;  
c )  the rates of failures of de novo entrants are a positive function of the 
cumulativeness of technological learning. 
(And indeed, there is a much longer list of empirically testable propositions 
that can be derived with respect to corporate entry and mortality from 
evolutionary theories of  learning and market selection). 
The way these theories link up with the evidence discussed earlier on decision 
biases is that they fully acknowledge them and in a sense try to predict their 
importance and impact on the grounds of some generalizations regarding the 
patterns of knowledge accumulation, the sources of competitive advantage and 
the modes of market interaction. So, for example, evolutionary ('knowledge- 
centered') theories of industrial dynamics are perfectly at ease  with the 
finding that entrants - and, most likely, also incumbents - tend to take an 
'inside view' in their strategic choices ; having recognized it, they will try to 
predict under what circumstances the outcomes will turn out  to be, with a 
reasonable  probabi l i ty ,  brave  self-fulf i l l ing prophecies ,  or ,  converse ly ,  
miserable delusions. 
Not only that: decisions that turn out to be biased from the point of view of 
individual  forecas t ing  ra t ional i ty  might  have ,  col lec t ive ly ,  a pos i t ive  
evolutionary values.  
H e r o e s  a n d  m a r t y r s  i n  t h e  d y n a m i c s  of col lec t ive  e x p l o r a t i o n  
Entry dynamics are most often analyzed in terms of their  effects  on 
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competition - which are generally rather modest - ; of the waste of resources 
associated with the frequent failures - which appear to be significant - ; or of 
long-term impact of successful entrants on industrial efficiency - again, quite 
important - (on the first two points, cfr.  Geroski (1991) and, on the latter, 
Baldwin (1994)). 
Here, however, we  want to look at entry from a complementary point of view, 
namely the collective effect of both successes and fai lures upon industrial 
l e a r n i n g .  
A suggestive way to put the question is, following March (1991), in terms of 
t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  d i l e m m a  i n  e v o l u t i o n a r y  e n v i r o n m e n t s  b e t w e e n  
"exploitation" and "exploration". Briefly, "exploitation" concerns adaptation to 
a given environment and efficiency. Improvements on a grounds of a given 
set of perceived opportunities. Conversely, "exploration" regard the discovery 
of novelties -e.g. in the domains of products, processes or  organizational forms 
- .9  I t  is straightforward that in a 'knowledge-centered',  evolutionary view 
such dilemma might easily emerge. First, the knowledge bases required for  
"exploi tat ion" might  be  qu i t e  different  f rom those  most  conducive  to 
"exploration". Second,  w e  have  mentioned earl ier  that learning general ly 
entails path-dependency and lock-in phenomena into particular regions of a 
high-dimensional, and quite  ill-defined, search space. 
For both reasons, the search for novelty - and in particular, those forms of 
novelty which are  not contemplated by the competences embodied  into 
incumbent organizations- requires 'deviant '  behaviours often associated with 
new start-ups.1° As argued at greater length in Dosi (1990), the distribution of 
The trade-offs and dilemmas between 'exploration' and 'exploitation' carry over also to a 
more aggregate level, in terms of average or modal behaviours of the population of firms 
embedded into particular national institutions, collective competences, persived 
opportunities and constraints. For discussions at this broader level of notions like 
'dynamic' or 'Schumpeterian' efficiency as opposed to 'static' or 'allocative' efficiency, cf. 
B. Klein (1977) and Dosi (1988a). 
l01t is a matter of debate to what degrees incumbents are able to internalise search for 
radical novelties and endogenize, in a biological metaphor, the generation of 'mutations'. 
It has been suggested for example that the institutional organization of markets 
influences such an ability. In particular i t  is claimed that 'market based' financial 
systems such as those of most anglo-saxon countries induce strong pressures to short- 
termism and "exploitation" ,thus relying much more on new firms for exploratory 
activities. Conversely, 'bank-based' systems - such as Japan or Germany - might confer 
incumbents a much greater room for time-consuming and uncertain attempts to search for 
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mutations might be heavily biased in favour of mistakes: hence search efforts 
are likely to turn out  to be, on average, disappointing economic failures for 
the individual actors who undertake them. Nonetheless, col lect ively,  they 
might be a crucial ingredient of change. In this sense, the b iases  reviewed in 
sections I1 to IV -especially overconfidence, inside-view and illusion of  
control - are  essential to sustain exploration even when the latter is not 
individually rewardingL1 
There is another, related, way in which individual mistakes a re  an essential 
part of collective learning: this occur whenever also 'mistakes' d o  contribute 
to increase col lect ive knowledge. In that case  they represent  a sort  of  
externality for the whole system. 
These propositions are finding increasing corroboration in the evolutionary 
literature -in both domains of  natural and social systems. 
The  general requirement o f  variety-generation is indeed a quite  established 
proposition (in economics, see Metcalfe (1991) and Saviotti (1992)).12 And it is 
also well established that, apart from the most restrictive cases, i t  is hard to 
identify - for  the theorist and a fort iori  for  the empirical agents - any 
equilibrium distribution o f  'exploratory'  vs. 'exploitative'  behaviours.  More 
technically, only under highly demanding assumptions on the nature of  the 
environment, it is theoretically fruitful to interpret such dynamics in terms 
of (mixed) evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). It is so for different reasons. 
First, innovation, almost by definition, involves uniqueness and surprise. As a 
consequence i t  i s  misleading to assume that  whatever  s trategic pattern 
learned in the past will necessarily be the equilibrium one also for  the future. 
Second,  successful  explorat ion inevitably adds to the menu o f  avai lable 
strategies and thus deforms the shape of  the 'fitness landscape' in ways that 
new trajectories of learning. For discussions, cf. Zysman (1994), Dosi (1990), Aoki and 
Dosi (1991). 
Note that this argument is quite distinct from the hypothesis that 'explorers' are 
rational and risk-lover. Our point is that iirrespectively of whether they are risk-lovers, 
they certainly have also to be biased in their decision making in order to do what they do. 
Or, putting it in another way, g i v e n  their risk preference, if they were endowed with 
'rational expectations' about the future they would do otherwis 
12see also Allen (1988) and Allen and McGlade (1988) for a suggestive model on the 
dynamics of fishery driven by the interaction between "cartesian" fishermen (i.e. 
"exploiters") and "stochasts" (i.e. "explorers"); 
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may well be unpredictable to individual agents.l 
An illustration of  the collective role of 'Schumpeterian sacrificial lambs' is 
presented in Si lverberg,  Dosi and Orsenigo (1988). There,  we  study the 
diffusion of a new technology under the assumption that learning-by-using is  
partly appropriated by  individual  adopters  and part ly leaks  out  a s  an 
externality. Well,  under some  parametrizations of  the learning process, we  
show that unequivocally superior innovations might diffuse o n l v  if there are 
overoptimistic entrepreneurs who pay that price o f  the initial exploration: 
their failure opens  the way to the take off o f  the industry. Somewhat  
similarly, one of the properties of the model in Chiaromonte and Dosi (1992) is 
that a necessary condition for sustained aggregate growth is some degree of  
diversity of  microeconomic behaviours (related to e.g. to the propensity to 
innovate and imitate). 
This theoretical argument easily relates also with the empirical evidence on  
the multiple contributions of a growing number of actors (quite a few firms, 
but also public agencies, universities etc.) to the rise of  new technologies and 
new industries. At one level, the process can be  described in some technology- 
space in terms of emergence and establishments of  'technological paradigms', 
'dominant designs', etc. However, at a more behavioural level, the dynamics is 
driven b y  a network of  diverse agents  who, via their trials and errors, 
increasingly develop a commonly shared knowledge basis, recognizable modes 
of interactions, collective institutions, etc. l 
The construction of a socially distributed knowledge base inevitably rests also 
upon a mult i tude of  failed entrepreneurial efforts,  in  addition to a few 
impressive jackpots hit by the most ingenuous or the luckiest 0nes. l  
l3  Interrelatedness of the contribution to "fitness" by different traits, co-evolutionary 
effects and non-linearities are clearly sufficient to induce unpredictability. (See 
Levinthal (1993) and (1994), and Dosi and Metcalfe (1991). 
1 4 ~ o r  analyses from different angles see Rip (1992), Rip, Misa and Schot (1994), Metcalfe 
and Boden (1991), Garud and Rappa (1994), Garud and Van De Ven (1989), Callon (19931, 
Nelson (1994), Appod, Harrison and Kelley (1993), Miller and Blais (1992). In general, 
the view presented here is highly complementary with the idea of coevolution between 
cognitive traits, artifacts and routines outlined in Garud and Rappa (1994) and Garud and 
Ahlstrom (1 995). 
1 5 ~ h i s  statement is in principle consistent with formal investigation of 'distributed 
learning models' (cf. for example Huberman and Hogg (1988), Huberman and Glance 
(1992)) as well as with the experimental evidence on cooperative learning in new 
problem-solving activities (some suggestive results are in Egidi (1993). 
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In all that, we  suggest, the stubborn pursuits of unlikely courses of search, 
together with the other biases that one has discussed, might well be a wasteful, 
imperfect,  but crucial ingredient.  
VII  S o m e  c o n c l u s i o n s  
We have emphazized from the start the preliminary nature of this work. Still, 
if our  interpretation is correct,  i t  promises to provide closer  and more 
coherent links among four domains of empirical investigation which so  far 
have proceeded along quite separate paths, namely: 
( i )  the  na ture  of  cogn i t ive  and  dec is ion-biases  of  i nd iv idua l s  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  
( i i )  the regulari t ies  and  pat terns in the  processes of  innovation and 
diffusion (associated with the emergence of "technological paradigms" 
and "dominant  technological trajectories"); 
( i i i )  t he  ( r e l a t e d )  s o c i a l  d y n a m i c s  unde r ly ing  the  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
technological systems and, together of  communities of  firms, technical 
societies, university discipline, etc.;  
( i v )  the patterns of corporate entry, exit and industrial dynamics. l  
In a nutshell, our  argument is that various forms of cognitive and decision 
biases are likely to be intr insic  ingredients  of technological development and 
corporate strategies, including those concerning start-ups of new firms and 
d ive r s i f i ca t ion .  l 7  
l f i  The diversity between these fields and their relatively low degrees of communication 
with each other motivates also the choice of providing a rather extensive bibliography at 
the end of this chapter, which might help the reader in unfamiliar territories. 
l 7  Throughout the text, as a first approximation, we took a rather naive and 
anthropomorphic view of 'organizational decisions' (and related biases). In fact, our 
approach does not have any difficulty in accomodating a more complex view whereby 
organizational behaviour are also the outcomes of processes of political negotiation within 
the organization itself, grounded in the specific pieces of knowledge embodied in various 
'experts' (e.g. the 'engineer', the marketing person, etc.) (See Lane et al. (1995). Also 
'experts', our argument would go, are likely to display the biases discussed above. In fact, 
insofar as these experts share the knowledge of broader communities (e.g. software 
specialists, copyright lawyers, chemical engineers, etc.) they might partly curb the 
'inside view' associated with each individual firm, but at the expense of bringing in the 
'inside view' dominant in the expert community to which they belong. 
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This view easily links up with several other contributions to this volume. For 
example, it is  certainly consistent with Richard Langlois "cognitive" analysis 
of corporate competences and  behaviours. Indeed, the ' inside view' - with 
associated biases of "illusion of control", etc.,  discussed above - might be  
considered as essential corollary of cumulative and local learning, a s  analyzed 
by Daniel Levinthal.  Hence,  also the s v s  t e m a t i c  errors  of oversight  of  
potential ly r ich opportunit ies ,  s tubborn pursui t  of  pas t  commitments  or  
conversely overconfidence in novelty and change (cf.  the chapter by Raghu 
Garud, Praveen Nayyar and Zur Shapira).  Having recognized this sort  of 
inevitability of errors  - grounded in the very nature of  individual and 
collective learning, and in the decision procedures of s ingle humans and 
aggregates of them - there is little scope, in our view, to develop any sort of 
positive (or normative) theory able to accurately predict (or correct) these 
biases. However, we have suggested - largely in the form of a research agenda 
- that it might be  possible to undertake sorts of taxonomic exercises mapping 
particular types of  behaviour into particular characteristics of the knowledge 
bases upon which agents  draw. W e  have outlined an example,  l inked to 
research in progress, and concerning entry decisions. Of course the first task 
is  to show that entry patterns - as  observed both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally - are  systematical ly affected by persis tent  decision biases. 
Second, w e  conjecture that the biases themselves (and, relatedly, post-entry 
performances) can be  partly understood on  the grounds of the l e a r n i n g  
r e  g i m e  s characteris t ic  of  spec i f ic  industr ies  and  of  their  degrees  of 
development (e.g. whether a dominant technological paradigm has emerged or  
not). In a somewhat similar spirit, Janet Berkovitz, John Figuercido and David 
Teece, in this volume attempt to map corporate strategies into characteristics 
of the decision problems facing the  f i rms and the  competences that.  they 
e m b o d y .  
In any case,  a re  decision biases necessarily 'bad'? At a first glance,  an 
affirmative answer is  based on the intuition that biases tend to degrade the 
future performances of the decision-maker, compared - as economists would 
easily do  - with an agent endowed with 'rational expectations' and unbiases 
decision algorithms. However, in the final part of this work we  have argued 
that what might hold for the individual agent (of organization) might not hold 
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for the whole population of them, even for each of  them over longer time 
spans. In the evolutionary interpretation we proposed mistakes, and biases 
that make  these  mis takes  more  f requent ,  are likely to be  a necessary 
ingredient o f  the  exploration of  technological and organizational novelties. 
Paraphrazing Paul  David (1992), collective change might general ly require 
heros, herds and a lot of  failures. And hence, biases and mistakes might be 
considered as a sort of powerful externality through which society learns. 
W e  want  to emphas ize  that there is  no teleological connotat ion in that 
statement (i .e ... biases exist because they are collectively useful...). Rather, this 
is primarily a conjecture on  the collective dynamics of  a particular form of 
social organization -call it "capitalism"- which, for reasons well beyond the 
scope of investigation of this paper, have been able to steadily generate these 
forms of  "animal spirits". Indeed i t  might even b e  that,  in one  form o r  
another; the strongest individual biases survive both heightened incentives 
and organizational processes across different  cul tures because they might 
have to do  with some basic features of human cognition. This is  clearly the 
view o f  t h e  evolu t ionary  biologist  Lionel  T ige r  w h o  d i scusses  t he  
evolutionalily useful role optimism likely played in our ancestors' ability to 
proceed with the hunt and find of new territory in spite of numerous dangers. 
He argues that 
"Thinking rosy futures is as biological as sexual fantasy. Optimistically 
calculating the odds is as basic a human action as seeking food when hungry or craving 
fresh air in dump. Making deals with uncertainty marks us as plainly as bipedalism. 
This has very practical outcomes. Is is relatively easy to cater to and exploit this 
'psychological sweet tooth'. I believe that optimism,not religion, is the oppiate of the 
people. Religion is only one expression of the optimistic impulse. As well, exploitation 
based on optimism occurs in a wealth of places, not only religious ones; it occurs as. much 
in betting shops as cathedrals and stock exchanges as confessionals" (Tiger (1979), p.35) 
However, irrespectively o f  whether  o n e  entirely subscribe to this general 
anthropological view, and sticking nearer home, major implications follow 
from the foregoning argument,  in  terms o f  both theory and normative 
p r e s c r i p t i o n s .  
To end provocatively on the latter: are we sure that we want to teach any sort 
of 'rational' decision-making in Business Schools? How can one avoid the risk 
that less biased assessment of any one decision environment yields more 
conservatism and slower collective change? Should not one emphazize the 
heuristics of knowledge accumulation capable of increasing the probability 
that biased gambles turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies, rather than 
improving the 'quality' of decisions as such? 
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